While generally a steady ally of James Madison and the nationalists, Gouverneur Morris, delegate from Pennsylvania, worked from a different conception of republican politics. Morris' republicanism was more old than new, relying on the divided sovereignty of a mixed regime to protect the rights of citizens and minorities. This conception, the paper argues, bears the stamp of Machiavelli, especially regarding the relationship of the classes and the role of the executive. Like Machiavelli-but unlike Madison-Morris wanted to underscore society's class divisions, which he saw as constant, organizing the representatives of rich and poor into two distinct, and hostile, chambers of the legislature. And like Machiavelli, whose "civil prince" was the champion of the people, Morris' executive was to be the "guardian of the people" and the "guardian of liberty." A final section of the paper looks at Morris' personality and Convention maneuverings, some aspects of which are suggestive of Machiavelli. A conclusion reviews Morris' three main contributions to the Constitution.
when the average male height was 5'6") and as a youth nicknamed Tall Boy. He would have towered above all but a few of the delegates; and if he rambled about the room while speaking, he would have entranced the members-or irritated them-with the recurrent thumping of his wooden peg leg. An unusual individual, to be sure, whom a fellow delegate described as a wit and a genius, "conspicuous and flourishing in public debate," charming, captivating, and a pleasure to hear; but also "fickle and inconstant-never pursuing one train of thinking-nor ever regular." For in fact, the purpose of an upper house, he averred, was to represent wealth. So vital was this function, and so uncertain of success, that the upper house, or senate, was to be constructed as a set-aside for the propertied few. The rationale was what truly amazed, however-namely, that the wealthy must be given a chamber of their own lest they infiltrate and dominate the chamber of the people. "The proper security against them [the wealthy]," said Morris, "is to form them into a 3 William Pierce of Georgia wrote brief character sketches of the Convention delegates. These are found in volume affected the constitutional thinking of Gouverneur Morris. In making that case, 9 I am mindful of the fact that Morris was an "inconstant" thinker and a "fickle" personality. One of the many species of intellectual hegemony over republican thought in the eighteenth century exceeded by none but John Locke"
(450-51). John Lamberton Harper, who develops the parallels between Hamiltonian and Machiavellian foreign policy, says, "only the frank and feisty Adams admitted to having learned from Machiavelli" (American politically equal and mutually dependent, so much so that they effectively had but one interest.
Moreover, with a vast and empty frontier to inhabit, the country was destined to remain "but one great & equal body of citizens" for many years to come (1:397-404). Hence no reason existed to imitate the British constitution, however well-suited for Britain it might be.
Morris missed Pinckney's speech, but his own speech on July 2, coupled with those on July 6 and July 19, seemed designed as a rebuttal. The object of the second branch, Morris maintained, was "to check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of the first branch."
The misbehavior of state legislatures-which had inspired Virginia's James Madison to pen his pre-Convention memorandum, "Vices of the Political System of the United States," and which served as the premise for many of his Convention proposals-was cited as evidence that lawmaking by the people's representatives posed a clear and continuing danger to "personal liberty private property & personal safety" (1:512). Society was not one equal and interdependent mass, as supposed by Pinckney, but consisted of individuals of differing stations, any few of whom could be oppressed by the remainder.
The checking function of the second branch, Morris claimed, depended on three essential elements: interest, property, and independence. While not dismissive of "Abilities and virtue,"
Morris put greater store by personal interest: ". . . one interest must be opposed to another interest.
Vices as they exist, must be turned against each other." Vice checking vice was the secret, not wisdom enlightening ignorance or goodness overcoming wickedness. For Morris, personal property, accompanied by an "aristocratic spirit" that "love[d] to lord it thro' pride," was the interest and the attitude that properly defined a senate. He allowed that pride was present across the human species but that it showed differently in the poor than in the rich. In the poor it was reactive and resisting, in the rich assertive and abusive. But notwithstanding the more aggressive nature of the rich, the poor generally predominated because of their huge advantage in numbers.
Politically this meant that upper houses were creatures of lower houses, and experience at the state level seemed to confirm the relationship. On the other hand, if provided a mode of election independent of the people and of their representatives, specifically appointment by the executive, that size and diversity would break apart economic factions, forcing the construction of temporary coalitions for electoral and legislative purposes; and that moderation and justice would be the inadvertent byproducts of this necessity to combine and recombine for political success (June 6, 1:134-36). Morris concluded, contrarily, that a "violent aristocracy" would be the result of an extended, commercial republic lacking a class-identified bicameral legislature (July 2, 1:514).
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Morris did not explain why in an agrarian society a democracy would emerge from the legislative intermixing of rich and poor, except to reference the historical record as certain proof.
Perhaps he supposed that with agriculture would come small, uniform, egalitarian republics, whose politics would perforce be a reflection of the popular interest. 26 Perhaps he meant to apply that 24 In a letter to Robert R. Livingston dated October 10, 1802, Morris described universal suffrage as an aristocratic feature of American government, notwithstanding its democratic form (Sparks, Life of GM, 3:172). 25 Robinson, "GM and the American Presidency," 324. 26 Commercial society produces complexity, disparities of wealth, and community-wide avariciousness incompatible with democracy, which requires simplicity, equality, and frugality (D.1.55; Nedelsky, Private Property,
other side of his analysis whereby upper houses were the "creatures" of lower houses, sinking into "servile complaisance" if deprived of those institutional protections that made for their independence: e.g., non-popular election, life tenure, property qualifications. An upper house that merely replicated the lower house was worse than useless, and a government would be "better without it," thought Morris (July 2, 1:512).
Machiavelli is also alarmed by the prospect of patricians becoming like plebeians, as might happen if the former courted the votes of the latter. 27 Rome was once saved by its senators when they resisted the people's demand for relocating half of the population to Veii, an Etruscan town conquered by Rome but more splendid in its buildings and countryside. Because the senators represented a distinct social order, they had the wherewithal, and some of them the personal authority, to face down the inflamed populace. Persuading the public is difficult, says Machiavelli, because a policy that promises gain and excites the spirit will always be preferred by the people, notwithstanding the loss and danger contained within. As a case in point, Fabius Maximus was unable to persuade his fellow citizens of the wisdom of delaying combat with Hannibal, because delay seemed cowardly and because quick success was assured by others; consequently, three illconceived battles were fought and lost, causing the near ruin of Rome (D.1.53.1-2).
This turnabout in portrayal from malignant oppressors to wise and careful counselors occurred in Morris too. It is to be remembered that Morris introduced the senate as a careful, sober check on the unwise haste and inconstancy of the lower house. In that vein (though not yet 27 In the Florentine Histories, Machiavelli praises the Roman nobility for extending governing opportunities to the plebs in a manner that encouraged them to imitate the martial qualities of the nobles; and he blames the Florentine populace for withholding governing opportunities from the nobles unless they conducted themselves in a manner similar to the people (3.1).
reported), he proceeded to describe senators as among "the best, the most able, and the most virtuous citizens"; he defended their lifetime appointment as a safeguard against a change of measures; 28 and he charged them with responsibility for service as a "select and sagacious body of men, instituted to watch against [encroachments] on all sides." Rather than one of the sides from which encroachments were anticipated, the senate was now depicted as rising above the competition and operating as a guard. Nedelsky accounts for the change by postulating "ambivalence" in Morris toward the rich; 29 Nathan Tarcov calls it "an extra fillip on top of the more solid considerations of class interest, human pride, and institutional responsibility." 30 More likely though-or additionally-it was a recognition that with a different set of interests, different behaviors could be expected. Because senators would have lifetime appointments, the long-term well-being of the country and the effectiveness of government would become their concern.
Dedication to the common good would arise from the alignment of class interest with the public interest. This potential for good was best captured in the notes of Robert Yates, who recorded Morris as saying: "Give them the second branch and you secure their weight for the public good.
They become responsible for their conduct . . ." (July 2, 1:517; also July 6, 1:545). 31 Morris, it seems, did not discount the possibility that effective checking of senatorial malignity, coupled with exposure and responsibility, might result in enlightened behavior beneficial to all. Perhaps in the end Morris was attempting to co-opt a portion of the rich, installed as permanent lawmakers, to 28 Barlow, Selected Writings of GM, 237.
29 Nedelsky, Private Property, 80-81. 30 Tarcov, "Social Theory of the Founders," 177.
police the remainder of the rich, busy with money-making in the private economy-i.e., a quasiaristocracy recruited from the oligarchical class. 32 Extracting good from bad, and not just preventing bad, was a small, but real, part of Morris' constitutional thinking.
In the main though Morris put his faith in vice rather than virtue. On three other occasions during the July 2 speech did Morris show himself accepting of the dark side of human nature.
Appointment of senators to executive offices-tightly circumscribed under the Virginia Plan (Resolution 5)-was approved by Morris for the somewhat scandalous reason that competent government rested on influence, which Hamilton, when taking the same position on June 22, was happy to call corruption (1:376). Morris opposed payment of senators, but not for the high-minded reason given by Benjamin Franklin when discussing the presidency-that non-payment would attract the "wise and the moderate" rather than the "bold and the violent" and that the example of General Washington, who had accepted no pay during the eight years of war, proved the feasibility of gratis service (June 2, 1:82, 84-85). No, because senators would find sub-rosa ways of paying themselves and because non-payment would accomplish a property qualification without having to legislate one. And whereas Adams saw election to the upper house as an encouragement to and reward for good behavior, Morris saw it as a "bribe" and "noble bait" for demagogues in the states (July 2, 1:513-14).
In sum, when Morris took the floor on July 2, reintroducing himself to the Convention, he provided the delegates with a blueprint for the national legislature, modeled on, or reminiscent of, Machiavelli and promoted by Adams.
Presidency
As he had done with the senate on July 2, so on July 19 Morris offered a comprehensive statement regarding the purpose and organization of the executive. And as he had astounded the delegates with his proposal for a lifetime senate representing wealth, so again he astounded them with his description of the president as the "guardian of the people" (2:52). Most delegates gave that distinction to the legislature, especially its lower house. For example, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts claimed that he "relied . . . on the Representatives of the people as the guardians of their Rights & interests" (July 21, 2:75).
The origin of this expression, "guardian of the people," and later "guardian of liberty," may trace to Machiavelli, who devotes two chapters of the Discourses to the constitutional function of guarding. In Discourses 1.5 Machiavelli asks which of society's humors, the great or the people, provides a more reliable guard of freedom. Guardianship appears not to be a separate office of state, but a disposition to defend the constitution, its distribution and balance of power. As
Machiavelli frames the issue, the candidates for the title are themselves combatants in the struggle for class ascendancy; so a guardian is one who simultaneously is an interested party and a judge who holds all parties in their place. Machiavelli admits that the question is not easily settled, because history and reason suggest opposing answers. Among ancient republics, Sparta trusted its nobles with the task of guarding the constitution, as did Venice among modern republics; and both preserved their liberty longer than did Rome, which trusted the guardianship to the people. But a different answer is arrived at through reason, which inquires into the motivations and behaviors of actors and discovers that those who possess wealth and power never cease from their acquisitive labors, because they are anxious and fear losing what they hold already unless more of the same is added; also, they have resources and are better positioned to acquire. (Morris' rational inquiries arrived at the same conclusion, that the wealthy were insatiably rapacious, and that they also Machiavelli continues the discussion in the following chapter, but with a focus on the constitutions of Sparta and Venice, whose mixed regimes, without a popular component, were aristocratic republics, Rome's, by contrast, a democratic republic. What prevented the oppression of the people by the great in these two aristocratic republics? In the case of Sparta, its two kings defended the people as a way of defending themselves against the nobles, with the result that the people, not fearing oppression, did not desire a share of rule; and the state, restricted in size and wealth by the laws of Lycurgus, could be governed by a few who socially were not so different from the many (D.1.6.2). In the case of Venice, the status of noble was extended to all early inhabitants, who were called gentlemen, while later arrivals became the populace without political rights. The ruling class was too numerous to profit from oppression, and the ruled had neither cause nor opportunity to revolt, because nothing was taken from them or asked of them, and their numbers were always kept fewer than that of the gentlemen class (D.1.6.1). Accordingly, the aristocratic republics of Sparta and Venice were for many centuries united, tranquil, and free, but at the cost of staying small; while the democratic republic of Rome, for some shorter period of time, was united, tumultuous, and free, but with the prospect of growing great. Machiavelli prefers expansionary Rome, because, as he famously pronounces, necessity mandates expansion, and a state not ordered for it will one day be destroyed by external or internal forces (D.1.6.4).
Morris might initially have conceived of the senate as the guardian of liberty, for he The title of Prince 9 is "Of the Civil Principality." Machiavelli is in midst of delineating different kinds of princes (virtuous, fortunate, criminal), and the civil prince is said to be one who comes to power "with the support of his fellow citizens." That support is not registered by election, however, for the city Machiavelli presents is on the cusp of civil war, and the factions are each searching for a champion to help them defeat their class opponent. This is where the humors are introduced, and the result of their competition, Machiavelli reckons, is "principality or liberty or license." The last of these outcomes, license, most likely describes the triumph of the people in a simple, democratic regime; for "the popular is without difficulty converted into the licentious,"
says Machiavelli in the Discourses (1.2.2). Principality, the first of these outcomes, most likely describes the transition of a civil prince (the chapter's title) into an absolute prince (the chapter's end). Having come to power at the head of the popular cause, the prince might later choose to cast off all restraints and oppress the people no less than the great. This princely absolutism appeared also in Morris' July 2 speech, which warned of "a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism"
resulting from the contest of the humors (1:514). In other words, when the few and the many, in a commercial society, fall into class strife, the fate of the many, barring the construction of a civil principality, is either oppression by the few ("violent aristocracy") or oppression by one ("violent despotism"). 35 Liberty, the second outcome, would seem to describe the relationship of the civil prince to the people, whose standard-bearer he has become. If the civil prince, content to rule through magistrates and guard the people, resists the temptation to seize absolute power-and Machiavelli specifies the hazards involved without supplying a remedy, as if to discourage the attempt-then liberty obtains. 36 Machiavelli has no institutional contrivance to curb the ambition of princes, at least not in The Prince, only the advice of a wise counselor. Morris, on the other hand, did-namely election, impeachment, and term of office. 35 Kaufman is of a different mind, describing violent despotism as majority tyranny (ibid., 333). Nedelsky attributes the rise of both violent aristocracy and violent despotism to the misguided participation of the public (Private Property, 87). Perhaps though it would be better to say that majority tyranny and misguided populism correspond to Machiavelli's licentious democracy coming to power in Morris' agrarian society. 36 The liberty outcome associated with civil principality is not to be confused with the political liberty of a republic, presented in Discourses 1.4.1. For the classes in Prince 9 are, after all, vying with each other to surrender their political liberty to a prince in exchange for protection and vengeance.
The prince in Prince 9 is cautioned against assuming power with the aid of the great, whose jealousy can never be assuaged and who are conniving and quick to act; by contrast, the people are "more decent," more easily satisfied, and too numerous to have as an enemy. Also, the people, but not the great, are grateful, especially so, when expecting harm, they receive benefits instead.
The suggestion is that a prince should first befriend the great, making use of their astuteness and energy; switch sides at the first opportunity, thereby ridding himself of envious and conspiracyprone supporters; and end by extending protection to the people. Discourses 1.16.5 recreates the situation in Prince 9: domestic strife; an exiled former tyrant brought back to lead the aristocratic faction; a reversal of course, with the repatriated tyrant, now technically a civil prince, betraying his allies and offering them up to the vengeance of the people; and a partial restoration of freedom. Security under the rule of law is the part of freedom that is restored to the people, not a share of power, which Machiavelli judges to be unnecessary because only "a small part of them desires to be free so as to command, but all the others, who are infinite, desire freedom so as to live secure." Machiavelli calculates that the political class, or those with whom power is shared, amount to no more than "forty or fifty citizens" in any republic;
for the remainder, security is freedom enough.
Morris' executive, here compared to a Machiavellian civil prince, was, as noted, a guardian of the people in place of the people themselves. Morris feared that the people, on account of economic dislocations, would, in a short time, be too corrupt to serve in that capacity: "Will But while a guardian of the people, the president would not quite be an advocate for the popular interest, passing "bad laws" on the people's behalf. 38 The people were noted for favoring paper money, tender laws, cancellation of debts, and redistribution of land (July 19, 2:52; July 21, 2:76). 39 The president would oppose these populist measures for the sake of property rights, the sanctity of contracts, and a sound economy, without which civilized society could not exist. personal interest in checking the other branch" (July 2, 1:512). 44 Toward that end, he nudged the executive in the direction of a monarch whose person was inviolable. But conceding now that even a hereditary monarch, with the equivalent of "a fee simple in the whole Kingdom," was not immune to bribery and corruption (and he gave an example from the reign of King Charles II),
Morris concluded that the president should be held liable to impeachment, provided that no dependence on the legislature resulted thereby (July 20, 2:68-69). Completing the conversion to a fully republican executive, Morris reiterated his call for a short term of office, after the Convention had heard proposals for terms as high as twenty years. He cautioned that "a long period would prevent an adoption of the plan"; and he declared, brandishing his republican bona fides, that "it ought to do so," for "he should himself be afraid to trust it" (July 24, 2:105).
Though republican, the president was to be energetic like a king. Morris began his account task. And continued operation meant checks and balances, ensuring that the dictator did not "escape his limits and . . . hurt the city" (D.1.34.2).
Which of these positions did Morris share with Machiavelli? Morris missed the debate on number-whether a single or plural executive-but was present when that debate resurfaced in the form of an executive council, whose consent might be required in order for the president to take action (September 7, 2:537; also June 4, 1:97). Morris opposed the measure on the narrow grounds that such a council could be used as cover for a president's bad decisions (2:542). But Morris also laid before the Convention his own plan for an executive council. Significantly, every officer of the council was to be appointed by the president and serve at his pleasure (August 20, 2:342-44), thus keeping intact executive autonomy and responsibility.
Like Machiavelli, Morris, as noted, supported a relatively short term of office, as well as popular election of the executive, which was how Rome's ordinary executives, the consuls, were chosen, though with qualifications. 47 The extraordinary nature of the dictator's office had no parallel in Morris, but the reason for hiding its extraordinariness behind a veil of legal normality 47 The centuriate assembly, or comitia centuriata, was where consuls and other high magistrates were elected. The senate nominated candidates. All citizens voted, but collected in "centuries" that skewed results toward the wealthy (see von Fritz, Mixed Constitution, 196, ; Nicolet, World of the Citizen. 219-24). American equivalents would be the electoral college (in lieu of direct popular election), its electors chosen by state legislatures (or the mode of choosing determined by the same), and the national legislature as the elector of last resort; also, election of representatives in extended electoral districts, including at-large, state-wide elections-these matters of detail determined by state legislatures but under supervision of the national legislature. Morris generally supported such tempering devices, if only as compromises. By contrast, the election of a dictator was by the consuls themselves, because recourse to a dictator necessarily implied some deficiency in the performance of the consuls, whose loss of authority would seem less shameful if given by them freely rather than taken from them by others (D.1.34.4).
did appear. The occasion was the debate over executive reeligibility. Most nationalists cited experience as their reason for preferring it, claiming that a term-limited executive would be removed from office just as he was becoming fully competent. The argument though was unconvincing and effectively met by the expedient of a single term of extended duration.
Accordingly, the Convention returned again and again to the Virginia Plan's proposal for a single, seven-year term without the option of reelection. 48 Morris, thinking more like a Machiavellian, added to the argument the prospect of usurpation by the incumbent-"Shut the Civil road to Glory and he may be compelled to seek it by the sword"-and defiance of law by the electorate-"In moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and established character of a favorite Magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution" (July 19, 2:53; also July 24, 2:104-05).
Machiavelli also cautions against placing the public in a position of losing the state or breaking the law: "For when a like mode [i.e., concentrated power] is lacking in a republic, it is necessary either that it be ruined by observing the orders or that it break them so as not to be ruined" (D.1.34.3).
The principal powers of the executive branch included veto, pardon, appointment, treaties, and commander-in-chief. In most cases Morris pushed for full and exclusive exercise of these powers. He recommended an absolute veto in the executive, though largely for defensive 48 Votes taken on June 2, July 17, July 24, July 26, and August 24 affirmed the Virginia Plan mode of electing the president. Shlomo Slonim attributes the enduring attractiveness of the plan to the advantages it conferred on small and southern states alike; and the carryover of these same advantages into the electoral college, plus that institution's neat balancing of national and confederal elements, is how he explains the final abandonment of the Virginia Plan purposes, which was why he also supported involvement of the judiciary in a council of revision (August 7, 2:200; August 15, 2:299; July 21, (78) (79) . He wanted the pardon power exercised by the executive alone, even in cases of treason, which some delegates thought "too great a trust" and an investment "peculiarly improper" (September 15, . He urged removal of the senate from a share of the appointment power (August 23, 2:389). At a moment in the Convention when the treaty-making power rested with the senate, he expressed his misgivings and proposed as an amendment that treaties be ratified by law, which perforce would require the concurrence of the president (August 23, 2:392-93), whom he later referred to, and in this same context, as "the general Guardian of the National interests" (September 7, 2:541). 49 The power of commander-in-chief was discussed in connection with state militias-when they would fall under federal control, how they would be armed and disciplined, who would appoint their officers-and in connection with the legislature's power to "make war," which on the suggestion of Madison that as "property was the main object of Society . . . it ought to be one measure of the influence due to those who were to be affected by the Government"; and that "the rule of representation ought to be so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the National Councils" (1:533). Morris' own position, offered the next day, was that the legislature should be free "to provide for changes in the relative importance of the States, and for the case of new
States" (July 6, 1:540). Relative importance would allow wealth as well as numbers to be taken into account. Numbers could be known with certainty once a census was conducted, and several delegates from the South, expecting population increases in their states, insisted that the census be mandatory. Wealth, by contrast, could only be surmised.
If it were to factor in reapportionment, approximate judgments would have to suffice. Morris fought the census tenaciously, appearing foolish to some colleagues (and many readers), because mixed-regime theory required that the social orders be empowered to defend themselves (Sparks, Life of GM, 2:247; 3:336). "Property ought to have its weight, but not all the weight," he stated (July 10, 1:567). Likewise, Lockean theory enshrined the importance of property, which Morris put ahead of life and liberty (July 5, 1:533). In the end, Wilson settled the matter, arguing that wealth correlated with population and that the representation of population would accomplish the representation of wealth (July 13, 1:605-06).
Morris opposed the easy admission and equal treatment of western states. He rated westerners "back members" from the "remote wilderness," lacking in political talent and "always most averse to the best measures" (July 11, 1:583). Unenlightened ploughmen were they, who could hardly complain of discriminations, such as under-representation, because they "would previously know the conditions on which they would possess their lands" (July 5, 1:534). 57 More alarming than their uncouth backwardness was their supposed proclivity to draw the country into wars-e.g., with Spain over navigation rights on the Mississippi-that the maritime states would have to fight at sea (July 5, 1:533; July 13, 1:604). 58 Also, the commercial interests of the North would suffer oppression if power shifted to the agrarian West (July 11, 1:583; July 13, 1:604).
Like many northerner delegates, Morris worried that western migration would depopulate the North, but not the South, costing the North its majority status in the union. He foresaw an inevitable conjoining of southern and western interests against the interests of the mid-Atlantic and northerner states: "It has been said that N.C. S.C., and Georgia only will in a little time have a majority of the people of America. They must in that case include the great interior Country, and every thing was to be apprehended from their getting the power into their hands" (July 13, (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:404) .
discriminations and voted to leave equal or unequal treatment of new states to the discretion of the legislature. 61 A small victory was this, perhaps never to be acted upon, but one that showed Morris, the foxy Machiavellian, striving to preserve his vision of America.
Conclusion
It is commonly observed that Gouverneur Morris spoke at the Convention more often than any other delegate despite missing a month of the proceedings. By and large his comments were extensive, substantive, and provocative. Sometimes they were consequential. While the paper's purpose is not to delineate all that Morris stood for and accomplished in Philadelphia, a quick mention of what arguably were his three most important contributions may be a good way to end.
Morris paired representation with taxation and by so doing disrupted the regional battlelines that were forming around the issue of slavery (July 12, 1:592). The South would pay for its slaves in the same proportion that its slaves were counted in the representation. A large, multi- apportionment requirement (changed to 1 per 30,000)? Possibly, since this requirement was once challenged, at the time of the Missouri Compromise, by some northerners who wanted the three-fifths counting of slaves denied to new, western states (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:430; Klarman, Framers' Coup, 277). preference for election by the national legislature-namely, the electoral college (September 4, 5, 6; 2:500, 512, . Wilson was the main architect of this alternate mode, whose elements appeared piecemeal throughout the course of debate; but it was Morris, in committee, who must have assembled the elements and refined the plan.
Finally, Morris composed the language of the Constitution, arranged the document into Articles and Sections, and supplied the Preamble. 62 "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice," and so forth, is a Morris legacy.
